docs: correct misleading "encrypted" claims for signed-only auth cookies - #694
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CookieAuthentication.set_cookie, CookiesTokensStore, and the OIDC result-handler docstrings described id_token/access_token/refresh_token cookies as "encrypted". They're actually only signed via itsdangerous.URLSafeSerializer (get_serializer), which provides tamper-protection but no confidentiality - the cookie payload is just base64, readable to anyone with access to the cookie. Clarify the docstrings so users don't mistakenly assume these cookies hide sensitive claims/token contents from the client.
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Summary
Several docstrings describe cookies set by
CookieAuthentication.set_cookie,CookiesTokensStore(and the two OIDC result-handler methods that use it) as storing encryptedid_token/access_token/refresh_tokenvalues. They're actually only signed, viaget_serializer()→itsdangerous.URLSafeSerializer.URLSafeSerializerprovides integrity/tamper protection (an HMAC signature) but no confidentiality: the payload is base64-encoded plaintext, trivially decodable by anyone with access to the cookie (e.g. via browser devtools, a proxy, or a logged request).This is just how
itsdangerousworks by default (same as Flask's session cookie, for reference) - not a code defect - but the docstrings actively claim the opposite of what happens, which could lead someone to store more sensitive data in these cookies than they otherwise would, believing the contents are hidden from the client.Change
Updated the docstrings in:
blacksheep/server/authentication/cookie.py(CookieAuthentication.set_cookie)blacksheep/server/authentication/oidc.py(CookiesTokensStoreclass docstring, and bothget_success_responsemethods that reference it)to accurately describe the cookies as signed (not encrypted), and to note that contents remain readable to anyone with access to the cookie.
No behavior changes - this is a documentation-only fix.
Test plan
pytest tests/→ 1922 passed, 1 skipped (unchanged from baseline)black --check,isort --check-only,flake8all clean on changed files