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feat(sandbox): ship OMP in the runtime image and share the host's OMP login - #402
Adds OMP to the Sandbox plugin: the runtime image now ships the omp CLI, each sandbox daemon turns Paseo's OMP provider on, and Settings gets a fifth "Use this host's OMP login" switch next to Claude, Codex, OpenCode and GitHub. Follow-up to #400, which missed it.
What changed
Image.runtime/Dockerfile installs @oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent@18.12.6 and bun@1.4.4 (omp is a bun program, engines.bun >=1.3.14). The image grows from 2.64 GB to 4.3 GB on disk. OMP is about 1.2 GB of that, mostly its bundled @huggingface/transformers and onnxruntime-node. I did not prune them: whether omp imports them lazily is untested, and a silent breakage is worse than the disk.
Provider on. Paseo ships the OMP provider disabled, so a bare install would never show it. Each start runs a small node step that sets agents.providers.omp.enabled in the sandbox daemon's config.json and then paseo reload. It keeps every other key and is idempotent. The daemon then reports Oh My Pi as enabled; without credentials its status is error: No default model selected, which is omp's own message.
Shared OMP login. The host's agent folder (PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR, else ~/.omp/agent) is bind-mounted read-write. It holds the stored logins in the SQLite agent.db, sessions and config, so the sandbox and host are one client of one login, as with the other three. config.yml, mcp.json, models.yml, .env, lsp.json, secrets.yml, the *.md context files and the hooks, extensions, skills, rules, commands, prompts, tools and agents folders are overlaid read-only. Folders on the list that do not exist are created empty on the host first, so a sandbox cannot plant one that the host's omp would load; files that do not exist are skipped. That list is best effort, not a boundary.
Mount target. The folder is mounted at /home/paseo/.omp-agent and the sandbox sets PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR to it, not at ~/.omp/agent. Docker creates a missing mount parent as root, so with ~/.omp/agent omp failed with EACCES: mkdir '/home/paseo/.omp/run'. The real-Docker test caught it.
Limits
Only the default OMP profile is shared, not ~/.omp/profiles/<name>.
The agent folder also holds sessions, history and models.yml (which can contain provider keys), so the sandbox can read all of it. The switch hint says so. Same Linux-only, uid 1000 and no-comma-in-path rules as the other switches.
The agent folder is a SQLite WAL database opened by the host's omp and the container's omp at once. It works on a Linux bind mount (one kernel), and I did not stress concurrent writes.
OMP reads ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and OPENAI_API_KEY from the environment, so a saved key works there without sharing. A saved CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN is not what omp reads (ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKEN is), so I did not link it.
Paseo has more built-in providers than the image covers: Copilot, Pi, Antigravity and Muse are still not installed.
Existing sandboxes pick up the new image when restarted, which rebuilds it once (about 1.5 minutes with a warm cache).
Verification
71 unit tests, biome and typecheck pass. New ones: the real node enable step run against temp configs (it found a bad newline escape in my first version), the OMP mount path and protected entries, PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR in the environment, and the order of enable, reload and sign-in on every start.
14 real-Docker tests pass (npm run test:e2e:local). They check omp --version, that the daemon lists omp as Enabled with its other config intact, that omp config list in the sandbox creates agent.db in the host's stand-in folder, and that models.yml cannot be rewritten from inside. They use stand-in folders, never real logins.
Mutation-checked: removing the enable step fails the ordering test, and so do moving PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR before the saved-credential loop and dropping the folder creation.
Checked the settings screen on an isolated daemon: five switches render and the OMP one persists.
Not verified: sharing against a real ~/.omp/agent with live logins, OMP making a model call (no credentials were used), and macOS. CI does not run the real-Docker tests.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Added OMP as a sandbox coding agent, including its required runtime and automatic provider enablement.
Added an option to share the host’s OMP login and agent data with a sandbox. Selected configuration folders and existing files are mounted read-only; missing folders are created on the host, but missing files are not. This option applies to the default profile.
Documentation
Updated sandbox setup and shared-login guidance for OMP and the estimated initial runtime image size.
… login
Installs bun and @oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent, enables Paseo's OMP provider in each sandbox daemon, and adds an OMP shared-login switch that mounts the host's agent folder at /home/paseo/.omp-agent with PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR pointing at it.
No actionable comments were generated in the recent review.
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Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between dec0fdb and ae9b9ac.
Files selected for processing: 6
sandbox/OVERVIEW.md
sandbox/README.md
sandbox/server/credentials.ts
sandbox/server/host-logins.ts
sandbox/tests/credentials.test.ts
sandbox/tests/host-logins.test.ts
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Walkthrough
The sandbox runtime now includes OMP and Bun. The sandbox can mount an OMP host agent folder, set OMP’s agent-directory environment variable, and enable the OMP provider during provisioning.
Changes: OMP sandbox integration
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Add OMP to the sandbox runtime sandbox/runtime/Dockerfile, sandbox/server/docker/image.ts, sandbox/tests/integration/provider.local.e2e.test.ts, sandbox/OVERVIEW.md, sandbox/README.md
The runtime installs Bun 1.4.4 and OMP 18.12.6. The runtime contract and CLI version test include OMP. Documentation updates the image-size estimate and lists OMP among the sandbox tools.
The OMP host-login option mounts the agent folder at /home/paseo/.omp-agent. Protected directories are created on the host and mounted read-only. Protected files are mounted read-only only when they exist. The sandbox sets PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR when that login is enabled. Tests cover mount modes, missing folders, and shared state.
Enable the OMP provider during provisioning sandbox/server/daemon-config.ts, sandbox/server/service.ts, sandbox/tests/daemon-config.test.ts, sandbox/tests/service.test.ts, sandbox/tests/integration/service.local.e2e.test.ts
The provisioning flow sets agents.providers.omp.enabled to true, then reloads Paseo before sign-in. Tests cover configuration updates, repeated execution, and provisioning order.
omercnet/paseo-plugins#400: This PR adds OMP to the host-login mechanism and uses its mounting and credential contracts.
Merge Risk: Minimal · up to ae9b9
The previously identified extension-directory gap is addressed. The supplied evidence shows no remaining issue that should prevent merging after normal checks.
Security architecture risk: Moderate · up to ae9b9
Optional login sharing gives sandbox workloads write access to host login and session data. Consent and read-only overlays limit exposure, but configuration protection is incomplete. Interrupted configuration updates can also leave a sandbox requiring repair.
Retained concerns
Medium · security · observed: OMP sharing delegates the host agent folder, not just a login credential. Sandbox-controlled processes can modify the login database, sessions, and other unprotected entries, including creating protected configuration files that were absent when mounts were constructed. This exposure is newly added for OMP. Sharing is explicitly opt-in and documented for trusted sandboxes; existing-file overlays and protected-directory creation reduce exposure but do not establish a host-state isolation boundary. Subsequent host execution through planted configuration has not been verified.
Low · reliability · inferred: Every provisioning run now rewrites the live daemon configuration in place before reloading it. A partial write or interruption can leave invalid configuration, after which the next enablement attempt fails while parsing the same file. Container recreation retains the home volume, and no configuration restoration is implemented in this transition. This introduces a sandbox-scoped recovery and rollback weakness affecting unrelated daemon settings as well as OMP enablement; an authentication bypass is not established.
Security review details
Security Blast Radius
inferred — Sharing is a global saved selection rather than a per-sandbox credential scope. Sandboxes provisioned while OMP sharing is enabled receive the same host folder, linking their writable login/session state with the host and each other. Downstream account exposure depends on credentials present in that folder; broader tenant, environment, or privileged-host access was not established.
Security Findings and Attack Paths
inferred — With sharing enabled, attacker-controlled execution inside a sandbox can read or alter unprotected host OMP state and create a configuration file omitted because it did not exist at mount construction. Host consumption could propagate those changes beyond the sandbox, but the external OMP reader and execution behavior were not available to verify a complete host-code-execution path.
Trust Boundaries and Controls
observed — Sharing defaults to disabled. Mount construction checks Linux support, source existence, Docker mount delimiters, and ownership or world-writability. Docker receives read-only flags for protected overlays, while the OMP destination is enforced through environment precedence. These controls constrain mount selection and known entries without restricting the intentionally writable remainder.
Resilience and Maintainability Implications
observed — The inspected integration test asserts that OMP creates agent.db in the shared host directory and cannot overwrite an existing models.yml. It uses a stand-in host folder and does not establish simultaneous host/sandbox database writes, token-refresh correctness, or interruption recovery. No tests were executed during this review.
Hardening Proposals
proposed — If untrusted workloads must retain host isolation, use a separate sandbox identity or a narrowly scoped credential mechanism instead of sharing the whole host agent folder. Treat the current mode as explicit delegation of mutable host state, not credential-only access.
proposed — Make daemon configuration replacement atomic, preserve file permissions, and provide recovery from malformed prior state. Validate interruption and retry behavior before relying on this transition for persistent configuration safety.
Pre-merge checks: 4 · 1
Failed checks: 1 warning
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Docstring coverage is 50.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 6 functions across 12 files. (2 skipped: …
Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
Passed checks: 4 passed
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Title check
The title clearly and concisely describes the main changes: adding OMP to the sandbox runtime image and sharing the host's OMP login.
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Out of Scope Changes check
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Full details: Docstring Coverage
Explanation
Docstring coverage is 50.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 6 functions across 12 files. (2 skipped: 2 unsupported.)
Resolution
Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.
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sandbox/server/credentials.ts
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sandbox/server/host-logins.ts
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sandbox/tests/credentials.test.ts
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Actionable comments posted: 2
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @sandbox/server/credentials.ts:
- Line 64: Move the OMP path assignment in the credential setup so it runs after
the loop over state.credentials; this ensures saved custom values cannot
override the shared path when hostLogins includes "omp". Preserve the existing
credential-loop behavior and OMP_AGENT_TARGET value.
Review comments at @sandbox/server/host-logins.ts:
- Line 81: Update hostLoginMounts to create the protected extensions directory
when it is absent before checking its existence and adding the read-only bind
mount; preserve the existing behavior for other protected entries.
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Adds OMP to the Sandbox plugin: the runtime image now ships the
ompCLI, each sandbox daemon turns Paseo's OMP provider on, and Settings gets a fifth "Use this host's OMP login" switch next to Claude, Codex, OpenCode and GitHub. Follow-up to #400, which missed it.What changed
runtime/Dockerfileinstalls@oh-my-pi/pi-coding-agent@18.12.6andbun@1.4.4(omp is a bun program,engines.bun >=1.3.14). The image grows from 2.64 GB to 4.3 GB on disk. OMP is about 1.2 GB of that, mostly its bundled@huggingface/transformersandonnxruntime-node. I did not prune them: whether omp imports them lazily is untested, and a silent breakage is worse than the disk.nodestep that setsagents.providers.omp.enabledin the sandbox daemon'sconfig.jsonand thenpaseo reload. It keeps every other key and is idempotent. The daemon then reportsOh My Pias enabled; without credentials its status iserror: No default model selected, which is omp's own message.PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR, else~/.omp/agent) is bind-mounted read-write. It holds the stored logins in the SQLiteagent.db, sessions and config, so the sandbox and host are one client of one login, as with the other three.config.yml,mcp.json,models.yml,.env,lsp.json,secrets.yml, the*.mdcontext files and the hooks, extensions, skills, rules, commands, prompts, tools and agents folders are overlaid read-only. Folders on the list that do not exist are created empty on the host first, so a sandbox cannot plant one that the host's omp would load; files that do not exist are skipped. That list is best effort, not a boundary./home/paseo/.omp-agentand the sandbox setsPI_CODING_AGENT_DIRto it, not at~/.omp/agent. Docker creates a missing mount parent as root, so with~/.omp/agentomp failed withEACCES: mkdir '/home/paseo/.omp/run'. The real-Docker test caught it.Limits
~/.omp/profiles/<name>.models.yml(which can contain provider keys), so the sandbox can read all of it. The switch hint says so. Same Linux-only, uid 1000 and no-comma-in-path rules as the other switches.ANTHROPIC_API_KEYandOPENAI_API_KEYfrom the environment, so a saved key works there without sharing. A savedCLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKENis not what omp reads (ANTHROPIC_OAUTH_TOKENis), so I did not link it.Verification
nodeenable step run against temp configs (it found a bad newline escape in my first version), the OMP mount path and protected entries,PI_CODING_AGENT_DIRin the environment, and the order of enable, reload and sign-in on every start.npm run test:e2e:local). They checkomp --version, that the daemon listsompasEnabledwith its other config intact, thatomp config listin the sandbox createsagent.dbin the host's stand-in folder, and thatmodels.ymlcannot be rewritten from inside. They use stand-in folders, never real logins.PI_CODING_AGENT_DIRbefore the saved-credential loop and dropping the folder creation.~/.omp/agentwith live logins, OMP making a model call (no credentials were used), and macOS. CI does not run the real-Docker tests.Summary by CodeRabbit