HYPERFLEET-1498 - docs: update ADR-0018 to align with gateway decision

[Mischulee]

Summary

• Updates ADR-0018 (E2E JWT/TLS Architecture) to align with the gateway decision recorded in ADR-0020
• E2E tests now route through the Envoy gateway, Authorino performs TokenReview and injects identity headers, API retains JWT validation as defense-in-depth only
• Ticket: HYPERFLEET-1498

Test Plan

• ./hack/markdownlint.sh passes
• ./hack/yamllint.sh passes
• ./hack/linkcheck.sh passes

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Caution

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📝 Walkthrough

Summary by CodeRabbit

• Documentation
  • Updated the security architecture documentation to reflect gateway-based request routing and JWT validation.
  • Clarified TLS termination responsibilities and the API’s additional token validation safeguards.
  • Documented identity propagation, audit information, and gateway-level unauthorized and forbidden responses.
  • Updated end-to-end testing guidance to cover the revised request flow and security checks.
  • Recorded the required gateway infrastructure and refreshed the decision date.

Walkthrough

The ADR updates its date and replaces the direct ingress-to-API flow with Envoy and Authorino. Envoy routes requests, Authorino validates JWTs through Kubernetes TokenReview, and identity headers reach the API. The API retains defense-in-depth validation. E2E tests now target Envoy and cover header handling, identity, audit fields, and gateway-generated 401/403 responses. The ADR also records Envoy and Authorino as required infrastructure.

Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes

Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to b48c0

The ADR now routes E2E traffic through Envoy and Authorino but leaves critical authentication and deployment requirements unspecified, including direct API isolation, trusted-header handling, subject authorization, gateway prerequisites, and API JWT forwarding. Implementations based on the document could fail authentication or accept forged identity headers, so merge should be blocked until these contracts are corrected.

Suggested reviewers: ldornele

🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 11

✅ Passed checks (11 passed)

Check name	Status	Explanation
Docstring Coverage	✅ Passed	No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check.
Linked Issues check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Out of Scope Changes check	✅ Passed	Check skipped because no linked issues were found for this pull request.
Sec-02: Secrets In Log Output	✅ Passed	The PR changes only one Markdown ADR; its added lines contain no slog, log, logr, zap, or fmt.Print* log statement.
No Hardcoded Secrets	✅ Passed	The only changed file is an ADR documentation sample. It contains no literal credentials, embedded-credential URLs, private keys, or encoded secrets; token references are placeholders or command ou...
No Weak Cryptography	✅ Passed	The PR changes only ADR-0018 documentation; the diff adds no banned primitives, custom cryptography, or secret comparisons. A repository scan found no crypto/md5, crypto/des, crypto/rc4, SHA-1, or...
No Injection Vectors	✅ Passed	The commit changes only one Markdown ADR; added content contains no SQL construction, exec.Command, template.HTML, or yaml.Unmarshal sink.
No Privileged Containers	✅ Passed	The PR changes only an ADR Markdown file; no Kubernetes manifest, Helm template, or Dockerfile changed, and added lines contain no prohibited privilege settings.
No Pii Or Sensitive Data In Logs	✅ Passed	The PR changes only one Markdown ADR. The added content contains no slog, logr, zap, log, or fmt.Print logging statements and exposes no PII, session IDs, bodies, or credentialed hostnames.
Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly identifies the ADR update and its alignment with the gateway decision.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description directly explains the ADR changes, gateway architecture, testing scope, and linked ticket.

✨ Finishing Touches

🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)

• Create PR with unit tests

✨ Simplify code

• Create PR with simplified code

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Actionable comments posted: 5

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Inline comments:
In `@hyperfleet/adrs/0018-e2e-jwt-tls-architecture.md`:
- Around line 19-45: Update the ADR’s “Decision” section to require a Kubernetes
NetworkPolicy that allows hyperfleet-api ingress only from the Envoy gateway,
preventing direct clients from forging injected identity headers. Add an E2E
direct-route denial test that attempts to reach the API without traversing Envoy
and verifies the request is rejected; keep gateway-authenticated traffic
behavior unchanged.
- Line 128: Update the “Minimal infrastructure” statement in the E2E JWT/TLS
architecture document to list Envoy and Authorino pods, their AuthConfig
resources, readiness checks, and highly available deployment as required
prerequisites, consistent with the documented gateway flow and HyperFleet
architecture.
- Around line 86-99: Update the E2E JWT/TLS architecture flow to document
Authorino’s subject allowlist, including the dynamic e2e-${RUN_ID} namespace and
hyperfleet-e2e-sa service account authorized by the AuthConfig rule; reference
that rule if already documented elsewhere. Ensure the 403 test uses a valid
token with an unlisted subject, while the listed subject remains authorized.
- Around line 110-115: Update the E2E JWT/TLS architecture acceptance criteria
to require a test verifying Envoy strips all client-supplied identity and tenant
headers before ext_authz/Authorino runs, then preserves the complete
gateway-injected trusted-header set afterward. Anchor the requirement to the
“Gateway authentication” and “Caller identity injected by Authorino” coverage
items, and ensure the test detects forged headers reaching Authorino or injected
headers being removed.
- Line 68: Update the API Configuration section to define the authentication
contract: require Authorization: Bearer <token> when JWT is enabled, document
Envoy forwarding Authorization to hyperfleet-api, and state that injected
identity headers only establish audit identity after API JWT validation. Correct
the configuration example to use jwt.configs instead of the unsupported flat
issuer_url field.

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ℹ️ Review info

⚙️ Run configuration

Configuration used: Central YAML (base), Organization UI (inherited)

Review profile: CHILL

Plan: Enterprise

Run ID: 86b8a2cd-a6f5-4c3b-b8ba-7178cddd9d8b

📥 Commits

Reviewing files that changed from the base of the PR and between a6ed748 and b48c08b.

📒 Files selected for processing (1)

• hyperfleet/adrs/0018-e2e-jwt-tls-architecture.md

🔗 Linked repositories identified

CodeRabbit considers these linked repositories for cross-repo context during reviews:

• openshift-hyperfleet/architecture (manual)
• openshift-hyperfleet/hyperfleet-api (manual)
• openshift-hyperfleet/hyperfleet-sentinel (manual)
• openshift-hyperfleet/hyperfleet-adapter (manual)
• openshift-hyperfleet/hyperfleet-broker (manual)

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